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Abstract 
 
In this study, the author develops an original reading of the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation. This text, far from giving rise to a “transcendental solipsism”, as 
classical commentators (Ricœur, Lévinas, Derrida, etc.) claim, leads to a 
constitution of intersubjectivity on various levels (“primordial”, 
“intersubjective” et “objective”). In its center, a “phenomenological 
construction” operates, i.e. a methodological piece that masters the genetic 
approach of intersubjectivity. Closely following the “almost mathematical” 
rigour of this crucial text of Husserl’s phenomenology, the author equally 
tackles the issue of the constitution of the experience of the other and the 
truly intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity. The article 
concludes with the metaphysical results of the analysis of the experience of 
the other. 
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Introduction 
 
In what follows, we will try to clarify the meaning and the 
status of the Husserlian phenomenology of intersubjectivity, 
supporting our interpretation on the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation. This text remains the most important reference in 
the field – although it implicitly sends us to volume 8 (First 
Philosophy, second part & other important additions) and 
especially to volumes 13-15 of the Husserliana, dedicated to 
intersubjectivity, which, we have to admit, bring elements that 
clarify the meaning in a decisive manner. Therefore we will 
refer to those texts that belong to all the periods of Husserl’s 
philosophical work. 
 
First, we will draw the plan that guides Husserl in his analysis 
of intersubjectivity. Initially, the issue is to establish the fact META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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that the meaning of objectivity is constituted within and 
starting from the immanence of the transcendental ego – which 
requires the introduction of the methodological procedure (that 
we will deal with in detail) of the “primordial reduction” – 
immanence on which the sphere of intersubjectivity is then 
founded. The latter brings into play two intimately connected 
meanings of “transcendence” (that characterizes the ego in 
relation with what transcends it): the primary transcendence 
(regarding the ego alone) and the secondary transcendence 
(regarding the alter ego) – a double constitution that, first of all, 
makes the constitution of objectivity stricto sensu therefore 
possible. The primary transcendence brings into play a 
“primordial” world (or nature) (made possible by the self-
mundanization of the ego). The secondary transcendence 
constitutes the “objective” world. Husserl takes several steps to 
establish all that. First, he aims at shedding light on the 
specificity of intentionality that is an open one and in which the 
being of the other is constituted and completed. Then, the 
concrete experience of the other is analyzed according to its 
constitutive moments. In this case, intentional analysis, in 
terms of “empathy”, brings the real ingredients of this 
experience of the other – Husserl aims at solving in this 
manner the problem of “thereness for me” (Für-mich-da) of the 
other. Finally, the issue of “thereness for everyone” (Für-
jedermann-da) is posed for the objects (be they “natural” or 
“cultural” – Husserl also says: “spiritual”), which is therefore 
the objective “actuality” (Wirklichkeit) itself. 
 
I. The meaning of transcendental intersubjectivity 
 
How could transcendental intersubjectivity be defined? And 
what architectonic function does it fulfill in the economy of 
phenomenology in general? In order to be able to understand its 
content, it should not be taken in a metaphysical sense, nor in a 
psychological (or psychoanalytical) sense, nor even in a 
sociological sense, but in a sense which draws on 
phenomenology understood as transcendental idealism. 
Actually, this is neither a systematic structure that grounds 
consciousness, nor a “collective consciousness” (or a “superego”). Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
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Moreover, it does not characterize a “social” (mundane) 
relationship that would be noticed from the outside. 
Transcendental intersubjectivity – and this is a completely 
original and new perspective – is a relationship between Me and 
the other that can be analyzed only within this relationship, 
starting from the ego. 
 
Methodological considerations  
 
If phenomenology aims at contributing to solving the problem of 
intersubjectivity – in a way corresponding to the prescriptions 
it gives itself – it should first answer the question that regards, 
as always in phenomenology, the mode of access to 
intersubjectivity (and its legitimacy). Here, two pitfalls should 
be avoided: on the one hand, the other should be acknowledged 
as the other otherwise the experience of the latter could not be 
distinguished from self-experience. On the other hand, it is 
impossible to have access to intersubjectivity “from the 
outside”, from an external perspective – as, from a 
phenomenological viewpoint, intersubjectivity does not allow its 
comprehension from a sort of meta-level beyond any egoic 
experience. This triggers the following question: how can 
otherness be attested starting from the intentional life of the 
ego without being condemned to a solipsistic perspective and 
without adopting, at the same time, an external perspective 
that cannot meet one of the “minimal constraints” (cf. J.-T. 
Desanti) of phenomenology – that of phenomenological 
attestability? Or, in other words: how is it possible to keep 
together two apparently contradictory statements – i.e. one 
according to which the world is presented “for everyone” (für 
jedermann), therefore  objectively, and another according to 
which any sense is constituted within the life of the 
consciousness ego1, that is, in the transcendental subject (which 
implies the opposition between the subject that experiences the 
world, on the one hand, and the world as it is in itself, on the 
other)?  
To answer these questions, Husserl conducts his analyses 
starting from two different points: a problematic and a 
methodological one. The problematic starting point – that does META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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not formulate a presupposition, but “has in view” what a 
phenomenological  construction2 would build – is that 
subjectivity is structured inter-subjectively (precisely because 
my experience is not really an experience unless it testifies a 
point of view that transcends my own sphere). Such a 
phenomenological construction will establish the sense and the 
being-sense of this intersubjectivity. In order to verify this, it is 
necessary for me  to be given an account of the concrete 
experience of the other. This will attest a transsubjective status 
of experience, starting from which objectivity will be 
established. And the methodological  starting point will be 
precisely the ego – the only possibility (in order to avoid a 
purely dogmatic position) provided by transcendental idealism 
that, as we know, aims at accounting for the constitution of any 
sense and being-sense starting from the manifestations of 
“functioning” (fungierend) transcendental subjectivity. 
 
 
II. “Intersubjective reduction” 
and “primordial reduction” 
 
Does Husserl make use, in order to have access to the other, of 
a reduction that directly reveals intersubjectivity? In other 
words: is there an intersubjective  reduction? In certain texts, 
this seems to be a possibility actually taken into consideration. 
For instance, the end of text n° 4 of the Husserliana XV reads 
that “starting from intersubjectivity, it is possible to establish 
the intersubjective reduction by placing between brackets the 
world in itself and thus achieving the reduction to the universe 
of the intersubjective that includes in itself all that is 
individually subjective” (Husserliana XV, 69; Husserl 1972, 188 
sq., 272). However, this is not the option Husserl chose in 
Cartesian Meditations. Here, he sticks to a strictly Cartesian 
path, and for a good reason: if we want to provide ourselves 
with the being-sense of the other (and, then, of the objective 
world), we must first delimit properly what characterizes the 
Self – a “solipsistic fiction” caused therefore “by healthy method 
reasons” (Husserliana XXXV, 281)3. For this purpose, it is 
necessary to use, as Husserl mentions in §  44 of the Fifth Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
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Cartesian Meditation, an entirely new methodological process – 
that of a specific reduction that consists in putting out of play 
any constitutive function of intentionality as reported to 
another subjectivity. This reduction – that Husserl calls 
“primordial reduction” – brings us in the presence of, or rather 
reduces the Self, in what concerns its relation to the world, to 
what Husserl calls the “primordial sphere” of the ego, in its 
irreducible  immanence, that is, to the intentional sphere – 
actual and potential – where the ego is constituted in his 
“peculiar ownness” (eigen). 
However, it should be stressed that primordial reduction is 
methodologically different from classical phenomenological 
reduction. While the latter brings us back to the constitutive 
ranscendental subjectivity, the former (that implies the latter) 
should be understood as a “dismantling reduction” 
(Abbaureduktion) (that is however essential to “phenomeno-
logical construction”) whose role is determined by genetic 
phenomenology and goes beyond the frame of a purely 
descriptive phenomenology. 
 
The primordial Ego 
 
How is it possible to characterize more precisely the ego thus 
reduced? It does not go back to a mundane Self that would be 
from then on “alone in this world” as if a “universal pest” had 
wiped off all other human beings. In fact, the abstraction is 
here even more radical: this does not consist solely in ignoring 
the other subjects, but also in what gives the mundane, 
objective character (and, therefore, intersubjective) of my own 
Self. What should be ignored is my Self as it is considered 
according to the form of what it is – and of what is true – “for 
everyone”. Again: what is then this primordially reduced Self?  
First of all, the primordial ego can only be characterized 
negatively. The primordial sphere grounds – from a constitutive 
point of view – the experience of the other as well as the 
meaning of the experience of the objective world (Husserl 1982 
§ 44, 92 sq.). In a passage from Krisis, Husserl warns us, in 
relation to the method, against the idea of “jumping” directly 
into the transcendental intersubjectivity, and thus “over the META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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original Self (Ur-Ich), the ego of my épochè, that cannot, in fact, 
ever lose its uniqueness nor the fact that it is personally 
impossible to decline” (Husserliana VI, 188). In this late text, 
all Husserl does is actually repeat what he had already stated 
at the beginning of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, that is, that 
in any constitutive phenomenological questioning – be it that of 
intersubjectivity – it is impossible to neglect the fact that every 
constitution, of any kind, belongs to the originally constitutive 
transcendental subjectivity, i.e. “my” intentional life  and the 
constitutive syntheses of this life “of mine”. Of course, this is 
not a “transparent” consciousness, since it encloses the 
potential and “anonymous” functions, pertaining to the “pre-
immanent sphere” and to “passive syntheses”. How should then 
this “original Self” be conceived? “But, in my spiritual ownness, 
I am nevertheless the identical Ego-pole of my manifold ‘pure’ 
subjective processes, those of my passive and active 
intentionality, and the pole of all the habitualities instituted or 
to be instituted by those processes (Husserl 1982 §  44, 98).” 
More precisely – and this is the feature that concerns 
primordial reduction here – it is possible to isolate by 
abstraction, at the center of the intersubjective sphere, a “pole 
of any affection and of any action” (Husserliana XIV, 170). 
According to phenomenological analysis, the subjective pole is 
not a predicate but a functional center to which all predicate or 
attribute is related and that is the reason of every possible 
individuation. Any subjective process, any experience, is the 
experience of a Self. This fundamental characteristic remains 
true to the ultimately constitutive level of intersubjectivity – 
although this original egoic pole can only be grasped by 
abstraction, according to a “dismantling reduction”.  
How can we understand the relation between this primary Self 
to which we have access due to this “dismantling” reduction and 
the transcendental ego to which the “classical” phenomeno-
logical reduction leads us back? In order to answer this 
question, we now have to clarify the relation between the 
reduced phenomenological sphere and the – mundane – sphere 
of the concrete and objective world. 
Actually, in the transcendental attitude, the constitutive 
correlate of reduction blooms and becomes visible: in the same Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
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way that reduction guides us back from the objective world to 
the transcendental ego, it is possible, conversely, to identify the 
constitutive act that allows us to acknowledge the constitution 
of the objective world starting from this transcendental ego. 
What is this constitutive act – which has a crucial importance 
(as shown in § 45 of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation)? Husserl 
calls it the “mundanizing self-apperception ( verweltlichende 
Selbstapperzeption)” of the transcendental ego. Due to this self-
apperception, the transcendental ego “becomes” world (see also 
Husserl 1972, 107 sq.). It is because of this that we witness the 
constitution of the world starting from the transcendental ego4. 
Thus, the relation between the transcendental ego and the 
primordial ego becomes clearer. What ties the transcendental 
ego to the mundane (concrete, objective) Self is the apperception 
of the world (Weltapperzeption). And to the extent to which the 
transcendental ego constitutes the world as a phenomenon, it 
can reach such “mundanizing self-apperception”. From now on, 
we can point out the following correlation: on the one hand, we 
have the mundane Self, within which we can make a distinction 
between the “souls” and the bodies and, on the other hand, the 
transcendental ego, within which we have to make a distinction 
between what is related to the sphere of his ownness and what 
is related to the sphere of what is alien5. What is related, at the 
mundane level, to the “soul” corresponds, for Husserl, within 
the transcendental ego, to the sphere of ownness, whereas what 
is related to the body corresponds to the sphere of what is alien. 
However, this does not mean that the sphere of ownness does 
not include consciousness, the mode of appearance, of what is 
alien! Now, let us explain and detail this difficult point. 
Through the positive analysis of the primal Self – to which we 
will continue at present – a meaning of transcendence is 
revealed, which Husserl calls “primary” or “primordial” 
transcendence. This belongs to a constitutive stratum beyond 
the objective world and constitutes – being at the same time a 
determining component of the concrete ego  – an “immanent 
transcendence”. 
Let us then clarify what this mode of appearance or this 
consciousness of what is alien that belongs to the primordial 
sphere consist of. Such a clarification requires the ex-plication, META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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the experiencing-explicating regard, of all that belongs to the 
transcendental  ego and this, in a new and original intuition 
that constantly and continually gives in its identity. So what 
belongs to the ego? It seems first that this donation is 
problematic: is not the ego given – in a living present – only in 
an actual perception, present in its turn? And isn’t past given 
only in re-collections and the future in “fore-memories” 
(Vorerinnerungen), therefore in the presentifications and not in 
presentations? Of course, but – and this is accepted even since  
On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time 
(1905) – there is definitely a way of original givenness that is 
not related to perception: that of the primary memories 
(“retentions”) and of primal anticipations of the future 
(“protentions”) that belong to the “form [that relates to an 
‘apodictic  a priori’] of the continuous constitution of the ego 
from its own life experiences as temporal (zeitliche) in universal 
time (Husserl 1982 § 46, 103)”. But the “original sphere” (which 
is that of the original self-explicitation) is not limited to this 
pure form: “Manifestly (and this is of particular importance) the 
own-essentiality (das Eigenwesentliche) belonging to me as ego 
comprises more than merely the punctualities and 
potentialities of the stream of subjective processes” (Husserl 
1982 §  47, 103) (which, of course, can only be applied to the 
units that are inseparable from the original constitution). To be 
more specific, Husserl refers here to three types of phenomena: 
the sensitive data which are constituted as “immanent 
temporalities” specific to the ego; the habitualities and 
sedimentations constituted as “abiding convictions” (bleibende 
Überzeugungen), which determine precisely the Self as a 
concrete egoic pole; and the “transcendent objects” (given either 
actually or potentially) – with the condition to take into 
consideration exclusively what appears (spatially) according to 
my own sensitivity (and to the apperceptions that are 
inseparable from the sensitive modes of appearance, that is, 
inseparable from my “own life”). 
This way, even before approaching the constitution of the 
concrete consciousness of the other, Husserl was able to set the 
distinction, “within” the transcendental ego – more specifically: 
within the sphere of what is specific to it – between what is Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
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related to the actual ego, that is, the immanence specific to the 
concrete  ego, and what is related to a first type of 
transcendence (“immanent transcendence”) that, although it 
belongs to the ego, concerns (but does not constitute) the 
consciousness it has of what is alien. Now, the issue is to clarify 
this constitution of the consciousness of the other, which, as we 
have already mentioned, will apply a second meaning of 
transcendence – i.e. secondary transcendence. 
 
The concrete constitution of the other 
 
In the analysis of the concrete constitution of the other, two 
pitfalls should be avoided, as previously indicated: the 
reduction of the primordial sphere to a solipsistic psychologism 
and the dogmatic position of a universal community of egos. 
Husserl’s purpose is to present intersubjectivity as a 
community of monads (a notion regarding the ego in its relation 
to the objects that are constituted in its intentional life, as well 
as to other subjects) – knowing that, as we have already said, 
this project serves to found objectivity. Nevertheless, objectivity 
cannot be simply supposed or stipulated – otherwise we fall into 
dogmatism. We should therefore start from the transcendental 
ego. But, on the other hand, this ego should not be considered as 
private or as “solipsistic” either – because otherwise, it is 
impossible to escape it. Husserl simply tries to account for the 
phenomenological factum of the “in itself for me” – where the 
being in-itself of the objective world is no less 
phenomenologically attestable, and effectively attested, than 
this being(-in-itself) for me. As Husserl states in §  46 of the 
Fifth Cartesian Meditation: “So much illusion, so much being…” 
(Husserl 1982 § 46, 103). 
But the analysis – which we have just reconstructed – of primal 
transcendence (that is, what is still related to primordiality) 
and of secondary transcendence are the two sides of the same 
coin! – this means that it is not a substruction, nor an 
invention, nor a metaphysical hypothesis: what we have just 
seen “is itself part of the explication of the intentional 
components (Bestände) implicit in the fact of the experiential META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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world that exists for us.” (Husserl 1982 § 49, 108). What should 
we understand by this? 
We might think that in order to explain intersubjectivity, 
Husserl posits dogmatically its constitution, without actually 
delivering its genesis. This is not true. In fact, it is enough to 
pay attention to his methodological prescriptions: “Here again 
it is to be noted that, as has been repeatedly emphasized, the 
ideas referred to [the world and its correlate – the 
intersubjectivity (Husserliana VIII, 480) – itself ‘constituted as 
having the ideality of endless openness’] are not phantasies or 
modes of the "as if", but arise constitutionally in integral 
connexion with all objective experience and have their modes 
(Weise) of legitimation (Rechtgebung) and their development 
(Ausgestaltung) by scientific activity” (Husserl 1982 §  49; 
Husserliana I, 138). Here, two aspects are decisive. 
Intersubjectivity is not at all posited or stipulated in advance, 
nor is it constituted subsequently, but it is constituted 
genetically, that is, it blossoms at the same time as the objective 
experience. From then on, in order to bring it to the stage of 
unquestionable truth, a type of specific legitimation is required: 
it is not revealed in a simply descriptive manner, nor in a 
speculative way – as imposed by the phenomenological 
constraint.  This  “type of legitimation” required is that of the 
phenomenological construction, which is always the 
construction or genesis of a factuality. This factuality is here 
that factum of the “world of experience” quoted above, as 
constituted in an intersubjective manner. 
And what constructs this “phenomenological construction”6 ? 
Actually, it constructs precisely that phenomenological Einsicht 
(view or comprehension) that allows seeing that, first of all, the 
experience of the other makes possible the fact that the 
primordial Self, although irreducibly one and singular, enters 
the monadic community, that is, it is one and singular only to 
the extent to which all the other Selves are, too; and, secondly, 
that the intersubjective community “deposits itself (in a 
stratum)” uniquely on the “world” of the primordial Self. There 
is no speculative dialectic here: the experience of the other 
transforms the appearance of the world for the Self, in what 
characterizes it specifically, into an appearance of an “objective” Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
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world, as it is “for everyone”. And all the “mystery” of the 
phenomenology of intersubjectivity resides exactly in this 
“addition of sense (Sinnesaufstufung)” due to which the 
experience of the other gives to the own world precisely the 
characteristic objectivity of the single and unique world of 
everyone. 
The constitution of this monadological intersubjectivity – that 
Husserl calls a “communarization (Vergemeinschaftung)” and 
where no ego (not even myself!) remains absolutely singular – 
means at the same time the constitution of a sphere specific to 
intersubjectivity that, as we have already mentioned, is no 
other than the “subjective” (actually: “intersubjective”) correlate 
of the objective world. Just as within the peculiar sphere of the 
ego, that is, upstream the intersubjective constitution, Husserl 
has made the distinction between what is specific to the ego, 
strictly speaking, and what constitutes the consciousness of an 
otherness, he now makes the distinction, within the 
intersubjective sphere, between the “transcendental we” and 
the objective world. And in order to characterize this relation, 
he uses here again, just like before, the term of 
“immanent  transcendence”: the objective world does not 
transcend the “intersubjective we” in an absolute manner, but – 
precisely – in an “immanent” manner. 
 
 
“Analogical apprehension” and “pairing» 
 
In order to actually account for the constitution of the other, we 
will currently develop on the intentional determinations that 
characterize the experience of the other.  
The analysis of the other as other requires the clarification of 
the manner in which it appears in a constitutive consciousness. 
Or, he could never give himself to another as he gives to 
himself, unless “it would be merely a moment of my own 
essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the 
same” (Husserl 1982 § 50, 109). In order to emphasize this state 
of affairs, Husserl introduces a new concept (that we have 
already used above): that of alter ego. 
The concept of “alter ego” is in fact chosen by Husserl in order 
to emphasize the “thing itself” properly characterizing the META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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phenomenological experience of the other: “the second ego, 
however, is not simply there, and strictly given to himself; 
rather is he constituted as ‘alter ego’ – the ego indicated as one 
moment by this expression being I myself in my ownness” 
(Husserl 1982 § 44, 94). And this “other” “according to his own 
constituted sense, points to me myself; the other is a ‘mirroring’ 
(Spiegelung) of my ownself and yet not a mirroring proper, an 
analogue of my own self and yet again not an analogue in the 
usual sense” (Husserl 1982 § 44, 94). The other is not directly 
accessible  – hence a certain “mediatedness” (Mittelbarkeit) in 
the constitutive intentionality of intersubjectivity. This 
mediatedness expresses a certain combination ( Verflechtung) 
between two intentionalities: in the consciousness of the other, 
intervenes at the same time a giveness of the self (of the ego) 
and an appresentation of another ego. This combination is that 
of an apperceptive transposition which is not an analogical 
reasoning (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 404) but, the quote from § 44 of 
Cartesian Meditations indicates it, an analogical apprehension 
(Husserl 1972, 87). (The different terms of a reasoning are 
related with each other through an act of the faculty of 
thinking, while, in the apprehension, the transposition occurs in 
a direct manner, without any intervention of an intellectual 
act). “But the analogy is not in full force and effect (voll); it is an 
indication, not an anticipation (Vorgriff) that could become a 
seizure of the self (Selbstgriff).” What does then specifically 
ground the apprehension or apperception of another?  
What does specifically characterize the apperception of the 
other, is that the “original”, meaning the ego – remains 
constantly present (contrary to the apperception of whatever 
object – for example this lamp – which does not require the 
original one, in which the lamp has been constituted for the 
first time for me in a “primal instituting”). The “primal 
instituting” is accomplished in a continuous manner! This 
means that the ego and the alter ego are always – and 
necessarily – given in a primal “pairing” (Paarung), as the 
(transcendental) condition of the analogical apprehension.  
Or, this pairing designates the primitive form of the 
“association” between two (or more) data – the one of “passive 
syntheses” studied by genetic phenomenology – by virtue of Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
  21 
which a “couple or a “plurality” (Mehrheit) of data is 
constituted, data which are certainly different, but passively 
recognized as “similar” (ähnlich). In the case of the experience 
of the other, these similar data are those of the appearance of 
the living body of the other and of the ego’s body as well. The 
pairing is therefore characterized by an intentional 
overreaching (Übergreifen) – “an overlaying of each with the 
objective sense of the other” –, knowing that the meaning of one 
could “awake” this same sense in the other (and we will come 
back to this), that it can re-cover it, etc. and that, this involves 
a “transfer of sense” (Sinnesübertragung) (which is neither a 
simple analogy nor a projection) of what is thus paired. 
 
Harmoniousness 
 
“The experienced animate organism (Leib) of another continues 
to prove itself as actually (wirklich) an animate organism, 
solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious "behavior" 
(Gebaren). Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side 
that indicates something psychic appresentatively) must 
present (auftreten) itself fulfillingly in original experience, and 
do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase 
to phase” (Husserl 1982 § 52, 114 sq.). Husserl claims here that 
the  Leib does not really manifest itself as Leib but for the 
harmoniousness of its expressions, gestures and behaviours 
(idea that Merleau-Ponty will also recall). In other words, there 
is something – and we will see below what it is – that allows to 
recognize the other in the manner in which this something 
indicating the existence of an alter ego allows to be constantly 
verified in a substantial manner.  
The apprehension of the other is in effect well grounded, for 
Husserl, in “this kind of verifiable [or attestable] accessibility of 
what is not originally accessible” (Husserl 1982 § 52, 114). 
In order to clarify this, Husserl proposes an analogy – which is 
based on the term of “intentional modification” between the 
experience of the other and the consciousness of time.  The 
other is a modification of “my self” (mein Selbst), just as the 
consciousness of the past is that of a past present – thus 
demanding an intentional modification of the present. In the META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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same way that the past demands a “harmonious synthesis” 
(Einstimmigkeitssynthese) in order to be verified as passed, the 
other is verified in harmonious experiences. And in the same 
way that the present can be aware as such only “after the fact”, 
that is in contrast with the (only just-) passed, the Self cannot 
be “mine” except in contrast – in the pairing – with the other7. 
As Husserl says elsewhere – and we would not be able to 
highlight it enough: “the other man is constitutionally the 
intrinsically first man” (Husserl 1982 § 55, 124). 
 
“Potentialities” of the primordial sphere  
in the apperception of the other  
 
Could we really be satisfied with this review of the notion of 
“harmoniousness”  ? Does it not already involve a regularity 
governing the course of mundane experience and, all of a 
sudden, the achievement of the constitution of the objective 
world (that we should however account for)?  
 
As we will see below, this is not the case: the constitution of the 
objective world is not presupposed since the sense of the 
objective world is in itself tributary of the self-mundanisation of 
the transcendental subjectivity understood as transcendental 
intersubjectivity. Actually the constitutive operation (Leistung) 
characterizing the experience of the other demands something 
else: namely the constitutive function of the potentialities of the 
primordial sphere in the apperception of the other. What are 
these potentialities? In order to answer this question, we must 
analyze the status of the living corporeity (Leiblichkeit): this is 
not simply characterized by the fact of having sensations, but 
also by its capacity to constitute the spatial nature. In fact, to 
that extent that the ego, which is first of all an “absolute here”, 
“can” go towards “there” – an orientation that “can be freely 
changed by virtue of my kinesthesias” (Husserl 1982 § 53, 116) 
–, it constitutes the kinesthetic horizon of an own spatiality 
based on which a uniform spatiality, or even orthonormed is 
built, at a superior constitutive level.  However, in order for this 
spatiality constituted by kinesthesias to be possible, the points of 
view of any “absolute here” of the other are already requested: Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
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“to everything alien (as long as it remains whitin the 
appresented horizon of concreteness that necessarily goes with 
it) centers in an appresented Ego who is not I myself but, 
relative to me, a modificatum: an other Ego” (Husserl 1982 
§ 52, 115-6)8. Or, according to Husserl, these points of view of 
the other Me (or of any “absolute here” of the other) reveal 
potentialities of the primordial sphere of the ego!  The fact that I 
am in a position to apperceive the objects “as if I were there” 
means that I do not perceive the other simply as an object, but 
as an “apperceptive” object – therefore precisely as an other 
subject. Thus, the primordial sphere is indeed already 
structured in an intersubjective manner.  
 
The Association Intervening  
in the Concrete Experience of the Other  
 
From now on we can determine very precisely the association 
which comes up in the experience of the other – analysis that 
Husserl proposes in § 54 of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. 
 
There are two types of associations: immediate associations and 
mediate associations. The immediate associations constitute a 
direct link between the given term and another one that may be 
given or not. Concerning the mediate associations, the link is 
not direct – and it is precisely the case of associations 
constituting the mode (Modus) of the “other”. How do we get 
then the second term of these associations? Regarding this 
matter, all Husserl’s critiques that only see, either a 
psychological description, or a desideratum which could only be 
satisfied by positing a mode of consciousness which is not 
phenomenologically attested, miss the essential part. We are 
here in the same case as, for example, that of the constitutive 
sphere of the immanent temporality (where one could dispose of 
all the elements of the immanent sphere and where, in order to 
account precisely for their creation, it is necessary to proceed to 
a  phenomenological construction descending within the pre-
immanent sphere of consciousness9). Due to phenomenological 
descriptions, we dispose of all links between what is “seen” and 
what is demanded, allowing to account for the phenomenon – META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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except what can be attested with regard to its validity only due 
to a phenomenological construction. Let us reconstitute the 
chain of these links within the constitution of experience of the 
other. The missing link, needing such a construction, is that of 
the mode of appearance of the other as other subject, which is 
not limited, of course, to a pure “body” (Körper). Here, there is 
my living body. There appears a body which is part of my 
primordial sphere, but which, of course, is not the “other” yet in 
the proper sense of the term (but in fact just a “body”). But, this 
appearance “awakens” (expression that we should not 
understand in the psychological meaning), in a reproductive 
way, i.e. starting from the ego, a mode of appearance “similar” 
to my living body, that resends to my living body “as if I were 
there”. I do not live this awakening in a concrete experience 
(because it does neither concern the Self alone – otherwise we 
would remain imprisoned by the sphere of the ego –, nor only 
the other Self – otherwise we would lose the Leiblichkeit) and it 
does not become phenomenologically comprehensible, except for 
the only plan where phenomenological construction occurs) of – 
possible – modes of appearance! Pairing is not just something 
between the “self” and the body appercepted there, but between 
my mode of apperception and the one which the appearance of 
the body there awakens (that is between two modifications) – 
thus at a constitutive inferior level! I “live” of course the 
presence of the other, but the sense of this “subjective process” 
becomes really understandable only through a 
phenomenological construction. 
 
III. Constitution of Objectivity 
 
Husserl’s analysis of intersubjectivity ends with the analysis of 
the constitution of objectivity. With this one we go beyond the 
limit that separates the subjective from the objective point of 
view of the constitution of intersubjectivity (the two 
aforementioned sides of the coin). 
At the end of previous developments, we could renew the 
objection according to which the primordial ego would be 
separated from the alter  ego by an unfathomable abyss – 
despite or mainly: precisely due to the phenomenological Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
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construction. Why is such a critique is still unjustified? 
Precisely because, as Husserl rightly says it (Husserl 1982 § 55, 
121), such a distinction supposes that the experience of the other 
has already accomplished its work! Taking the primordial ego 
as starting point is a methodological need; it is an abstraction – 
whereof the corresponding époché witnesses and gives sense to 
the latter – for the phenomenologizing spectator who realizes 
that what is phenomenologically f i r s t ,  i s  a n  o n l y  a n d  s a m e  
nature, constituted within the primordial sphere as an identical 
unity which encompasses both “my” nature and the nature of 
the other. “I do not have an appresented second original sphere 
with a second "Nature" and, in this Nature, a second animate 
bodily organism (the one belonging to the other ego himself), so 
that I must then ask how I can apprehend my Nature and this 
other as modes of appearance of the same Objective Nature. On 
the contrary, the identity-sense of ‘my’ primordial Nature and 
the presentiated other primordial Nature is necessarily 
produced by the appresentation and the unity that it, as 
appresentation, necessarily has with the presentation co-
functioning for it this appresentation by virtue of which an 
Other and, consequently, his concrete ego are there for me in 
the first place. Quite rightly, therefore, we speak of perceiving 
someone else arid then of perceiving the Objective world, 
perceiving that the other Ego and I are looking at the same 
world, and so forth though this perceiving goes on exclusively 
within the sphere of my ownness” (Husserl 1982 § 55, 123-4). 
This way, the sense of the primordial reduction is confirmed 
here in a very obvious manner: there are two “strata”, the 
primordial stratum – in which the other is given to me only as a 
“body” – to which we have access by bracketing the experience 
of the other, and the stratum related to a community of subjects 
– where this body appears to me as a “living body” and where it 
gives itself to me also being given to the other at the same time. 
But what guarantees the identity between my experience of the 
world and that of the other other? Knowing that there may be 
“abnormalities”, what would be the “normality” for an 
intersubjective experience of the world? Husserl answers that 
abnormality supposes normality  and that this normality is 
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of the other’s Leib – in the harmoniousness (Einstimmigkeit) of 
experiences (Husserl 1982 §  55, 125). As we have already 
noticed,  harmoniousness is the last mark of the world and 
therefore of an intersubjective community: «The Objective world 
has existence by virtue of a harmonious confirmation of the 
apperceptive constitution, once this has succeeded: a 
confirmation thereof by the continuance of experiencing life 
with a consistent harmoniousness, which always becomes re-
established as extending through any "corrections" that may be 
required to that end. Now harmoniousness is preserved also by 
virtue of a recasting of apperceptions through distinguishing 
between normality and abnormalities (as modifications 
thereof), or by virtue of the constitution of new unities 
throughout the changes involved in abnormalities” (Husserl 
1982 §  55, 125 sq.). How can we specify the nature of this 
“harmoniousness”? It is itself constituted – constitution that is 
“similar” to that of the identity of a (temporal) object or to that 
of ideal objectities (characterized by their “omnitemporality”) 
and that requires in all cases the “medium” of “recollective 
presentiations (erinnernde  Vergegenwärtigung)”. A connection 
is really (constantly) established between the primordial sphere 
of the ego, that is the self-experience of the concrete ego, on one 
hand, and the alien sphere presentiated therein, on the other 
hand. This possible presentiation is the subjective correlate of 
the harmoniousness of phenomena of the world. The experience 
of the other «effects this, first, by its identifying synthesis of the 
primordially given ‘animate body’ (Leibkörper) of someone else 
and the same animate body, but appresented in other modes of 
appearance, and secondly, spreading out from there, by its 
identifying synthesis of the same Nature, given and verified 
primordially (with pure sensuous originality) and at the same 
time appresentationally” (Husserl 1982 § 55, 128). To the extent 
that the intersubjectivity – as coexistence of the ego and the 
alter ego – constitutes a common time-form (Zeitform) (where 
the primordial temporality is an original mode of appearance of 
the objective temporality), the constitution of the absolute 
temporal flow (delivered in the Bernau Manuscripts 
(Husserliana XXXIII), regardless of this intersubjective Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
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dimension) is eo ipso tributary to the constitution of the 
monadological community. 
 
* 
 
How to conceive the status of higher levels of the constitution of 
the objective world? The mutual relations characterizing each 
member of the monadological community involve an 
“objectivating equalization” (Gleichstellung) (Husserliana 1982 
§ 56, 129) of the existence of the ego and the others. It is not 
from the empirical experience of the other that I can accede to 
transcendental intersubjectivity, but, just the opposite, it is the 
objectivation of the latter that makes me discover the other as 
having a Leibkörper in my field of perception; that makes me 
discover myself as being situated in his, the others as 
experiencing the others as others, etc. 
Moreover, this objectivation shows me the world 
transcendentally constituted in me is also, in its essence, a 
world of men. And that, not only in this trivial sense that the 
empirical world is populated with empirical human beings, but 
with the meaning – strongly reminding of Heidegger’s Dasein – 
that the world entirely derives from the experience of the 
human psychè (Seele) (not in a religious sense, of course, but in 
an existential one) : “the psychic (seelisch) constitution of the 
objective world we mean […] my actual and possible experience 
of the world, as an experience belonging to me, the Ego who 
experiences himself as a man” (Husserl 1982 § 56, 130-1). We 
understand, therefore, the complete meaning of this 
“mundanizing self-apperception” we have already discussed 
above. Indeed, the psychè or the “soul” is nothing but a self-
objectivation (Selbstobjektivierung) which is fulfilled in the 
monad – this “self” (Selbst) being the transcendental 
subjectivity as it is intersubjectively structured. The 
parallelism between the two spheres (that of the psychè and 
that of the transcendental ego) corresponds to the one between 
the respective fields of study of the phenomenological 
psychology, on the one hand, and the transcendental 
phenomenology, on the other hand. 
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Let us go back again to the notion of “mundanizing self-
apperception”. This one is at the same time a “self-
mundanization” (Selbstmundanisierung) (that is the way the 
Leib gets into the world), a givenness of the world and – it is at 
this point that intersubjectivity comes up – the institution of an 
intersubjective community. As Husserl asserts in a text dated 
from 1937  : “I, the ego, have the world starting from a 
performance (Leistung), in which […]  constitute myself, as well 
as my horizon of others and, at the same time (in eins damit), 
the homogeneous community of ‘us’ (Wir-Gemeinschaft) ;  this 
constitution is not a constitution of the world, but an 
actualization which could be designated as “monadization of the 
‘ego’ – as actualization of personal monadization, of monadical 
pluralization” (Husserliana VI, 417). There is constitution of 
the world only if the ego monadizes – which always means that 
it actualizes itself and becomes actualized as intersubjective 
community and in  it. The world is the “result” of the 
transcendental actualization of the mundanization (or “self-
mundanization”) of transcendental intersubjectivity 
(Husserliana XV, 403). Thus, if there is constitution of the 
objective world in intersubjectivity, it is not because we would 
account for the (already constituted) objective world starting 
from a subjective dimension, but this is precisely the 
actualization of this “self-mundanization”, that is the 
“extension” of a peculiar own sphere to what we call the “world” 
as correlate of the possibilities and potentialities of subjectivity 
understood as transcendental intersubjectivity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen that there is transcendence of objectivity only by 
virtue of intersubjectivity, and that is why phenomenology is a 
transcendental philosophy or, as Husserl says sometimes, a 
“’sociological’ transcendental philosophy” (Husserliana  IX, 539) 
or even a “transcendental sociology” (Husserliana XI, 220). This 
means that the phenomenology does not only propose a 
phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity, but it is itself 
intersubjective, delivering valid analyses in an objective Alexander Schnell / Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Work  
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manner and for everyone (this is what an analysis of 
intersubjectivity precisely requires). 
It appears indeed that the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, 
even though it unveils the correlation intersubjectivity-world 
(see Husserliana VIII, 432, 480, 495 sq.), always starts from an 
individual ego and not from a “collective consciousness” (which 
would go back to a dogmatic positing of intersubjectivity). But 
this is just a methodological starting point: the transcendental 
ego is only a restraint aspect of transcendental 
intersubjectivity10, but at the same time it grounds it (fundiert). 
Contrary to Schütz’s assertions which made of intersubjectivity 
a dimension of the only life-world (which would short-circuit 
any transcendental and constitutive project of intersubjectivity) 
(Schütz 1957, 81-107), it obtains its sense and its being-sense 
only if it is constructed, a construction which is not at all 
speculative, but which follows from an essential need. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 For the constitution of the sense of the other in the ego, cf. Husserliana VI, 
189; Husserliana XV, 39, 369 sq. 
2 The phenomenology of intersubjectivity – like that of time, of the original 
hylè, etc. – carries out a phenomenological construction in which purely 
descriptive analyses stop at dead ends or aporias. A phenomenological 
construction is not a speculative construction, but commanded by phenomena 
themselves: it is actualized by the descent in a pre-immanent sphere, below 
the immanent sphere of transcendental conscience, thus explaining the 
constitutive phenomena of the latter. We have treated the phenomenological 
construction in more detail in Schnell 2004 a, 33 sq. ; Schnell 2004 b, 9-14, 
202 sq., 250sq., 255 sq.; and especially Schnell 2007. 
3  In lesson 35 of the Philosophie première (vol. II), Husserl evokes another 
reason (that will not be mentioned again later on) that justifies the need for a 
“Cartesian” beginning: only such a beginning actually allows avoiding – in a 
case where other subjects would become crazy! – the situation in which 
experience is not harmonious. 
4 And regarding the idea that the passage of the transcendental Self to the 
natural Self is done due to an objectivation of the self,  cf. for example 
Husserliana IX, 294. 
5 What is related to the “psychic” (to the “soul” of the concrete Self) is 
transcendentally “secondary” in relation to the own sphere of the 
transcendental  ego (which is therefore transcendentally “primary”). And 
Husserl characterizes this secondary transcendence as follows: it is “ 
transcendence alone which can be called in this way and all that is also called 
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transcendence apart from that – such as the objective world – rests on the 
transcendence of the other’s subjectivity » (Husserliana VIII, 495). 
6 We insist: this is not a metaphysical or a speculative construction, but a 
stress of an inter-subjectivity that appears at the same time (“in one”) as 
objective experience. 
7 See for example Husserliana XIII, 6, 244, 247 (but also, in opposition to this, 
Husserliana XV, 351. 
8 Also see Husserliana XXXV, 281 sq. Regarding ”the open intersubjectivity » 
discussed here, we can relate to the analyses of Dan Zahavi (Zahavi 1996, 35-
40). 
9 Concerning this matter, we refer to our work Schnell 2004 b (section C, 
chapter III). 
10 Acc. to the first version of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation (1929): “Thus 
transcendental subjectivity spreads all over intersubjectivity or it is rather 
transcendental subjectivity that is more comprehensive in itself. It is 
comprehensive as “promordi(n)al monad which intentionally contains in itself 
other monads that it has to treat like other transcendentals (transzendentale 
Ander) […] » (Husserliana XV, 17). 
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